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Citizenship from theMargins: Vernacular Theories of
Rights and the State from the Interwar Caribbean
Lara Putnam
Abstract This essay explores debates over political membership and rights within
empire from the interwar British Caribbean. Although no formal status of imperial,
British, or colonial citizenship existed in this era, British Caribbeans routinely hailed
each other as meritorious local “citizens,” demanded political rights due them as
“British citizens,” and decried rulers’ failure to treat colored colonials equally with
other “citizens” of the empire. In the same years, the hundreds of thousands of
British West Indians who labored in circum-Caribbean republics like the United
States, Panama, Cuba, Venezuela, and Costa Rica experienced firsthand the inter-
national consolidation of formal citizenship as a state-issued credential ensuring mobi-
lity and abode. This convergence pushed British Caribbeans at home and abroad to
question the costs of political disfranchisement and the place of race within empire.
The vernacular political philosophy they developed in response importantly comp-
lements the influential theories of citizenship and rights developed by European thinkers
of the same generation, such as T. H. Marshall and Hannah Arendt.
This essay explores debates over political membership and rights withinempire from the interwar British Caribbean. I track in those debatesthe specific and conflicting meanings of the word “citizen.” I also trace
the concerns “citizen” and “citizenship” came to invoke, clustered around civic par-
ticipation, political voice, and mobility rights. The role of racial hierarchy in under-
cutting state protection for colonial subjects’ rights was debated more and more
explicitly as the era wore on.
Debates over citizenship within empire were importantly driven by trends beyond
the empire’s borders. By 1930, over 170,000 British West Indians resided outside of
British territory in circum-Caribbean republics from Venezuela to Panama to the
United States. Each and every one of these lands imposed antiblack immigration
laws in the late 1920s and 1930s. Was this the future the modern world held for sub-
jects of color? In overseas communities and among activists and observers back
home, the era saw passionate debates over the costs of political disfranchisement,
the need for territorial belonging, and the role of race within empire.
This supraregional experience was a fundamental precursor to postwar Caribbean
migration to Great Britain both materially—pushing emigrants toward a distant
Lara Putnam is professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh. She is grateful to Roger Rouse, Nico
Slate, Paul Kramer, Diana Paton, and Kennetta Perry as well as participants at the Society for Caribbean
Studies Caribbean Research Seminar in the North and the North American Conference on British
Studies 2012 Annual Meeting, for feedback on earlier drafts. She would also like to thank two anonymous
JBS reviewers for detailed critiques that greatly improved this article.
Journal of British Studies 53 (January 2014): 162–191. doi:10.1017/jbr.2013.241
© The North American Conference on British Studies, 2014
162
metropole that had become the only destination where they could claim the right to
enter and work—and culturally—shaping the range of concerns and convictions men
and women carried as they stepped down the gangway toward a cold and foggy new
destination. Within the existing historiography on colonial migration to Great
Britain, there is confusion over that backstory, even in its most basic elements. For
instance, the impact of the de facto ban on British West Indian entry to the
United States after 1924 has been obscured by the presumption that British subjects
of color continued to enter the United States under the British quota. In a world
where laws worked as written and states were race blind, they would have.
However, as British West Indians knew fully well, they did not live in such a world.
Scholars in recent decades have reconstructed the long history of struggles by colo-
nials of color in the metropole.1 The present article suggests an alternative framing
and a complementary history. In the interwar years, as one or two thousand
British West Indians sought opportunity and rights in Great Britain, over two
hundred thousand British West Indians lived out dilemmas and exclusions—some
similar, some different—in Panama, Cuba, Costa Rica, Venezuela, the United
States, and beyond. They debated the significance of their experiences on street
corners, in rum shops, at United Negro Improvement Association halls, and in a
print public sphere powered by editors of color, which linked home islands to receiv-
ing rimlands via newspapers read by scores of thousands.2
Where would these debates lead? Let us glance ahead to London, 1948, noting the
juxtaposition of three events apparently quite distinct in their origins and signifi-
cance. On 22 June, the former troop transport Empire Windrush arrived, carrying
493 British West Indians planning to work. On 22 July, Parliament concluded
debate on the British Nationality Act, creating the unprecedented category of
“Citizen of the United Kingdom and the Colonies.” And at the London School of
Economics, pioneering sociologist T. H. Marshall was preparing notes for a
lecture he would deliver in 1949, and publish in 1950, titled “Citizenship and
Social Class.” Each of these events has great significance in scholarly consideration
of the evolution of political belonging in modern Britain. But how they fit together
is unclear.
Stepping back in time and away from London, we will see the entanglement of the
processes that produced the Windrush arrivals, the Nationality Act, and the insights
and absences of T. H. Marshall’s view of citizenship. The entangled backstory of these
three events reflected a generation-long international process of state formation in
which the growth of populist politics, the centering of popular welfare, and the con-
struction of racialized barriers to entry were fundamentally fused. As a global trend,
1 Peter Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (London, 1984); Laura Tabili, “We Ask
for British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain (Ithaca, NY, 1994); Winston
James, “The Black Experience in Twentieth-Century Britain,” in The Black Experience and the Empire,
ed. Philip Morgan and Sean Hawkins (Oxford, 2004), 347–86.
2 Lara Putnam, Radical Moves: Caribbean Migrants and the Politics of Race in the Jazz Age (Chapel Hill,
NC, 2013), chap. 4; Putnam, “The Rising Tide of Color: Print Circuits and Internationalism from the
Peripheries in the Interwar Era” (paper presented at conference, “Print Culture Beyond the Metropolis,”
Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, 15–16 March 2013). The circulation of the UNIA’s Negro World
alone in the 1920s ranged between 17,000 and 60,000 copies. Robert A. Hill, The Marcus Garvey and
Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, vol. 7, November 1927–August 1940 (Berkeley, CA,
1991), 997–1000.
THEORIES OF RIGHTS AND THE STATE FROM THE INTERWAR CARIBBEAN ▪ 163
the entitlements citizens claimed on their home turf were expanding, in the form of
nascent welfare states and proemployment policies, while the access accorded non-
citizens was shrinking. By the 1930s, mobility rights—including both would-be emi-
grants’ right to enter and labor elsewhere and their right of return—had joined
political and civil rights as privileges that individuals could not claim without the
support of their governing state.
Although Marshall and the members of Parliament who drafted the 1948 Nation-
ality Act seemed almost willfully blind to the tensions these international trends fore-
told for an imperial Britain, men and women in the British Caribbean had been
grappling explicitly with these tensions for a full generation. They had a detailed
understanding of the racialized global hierarchies that made rights in practice
unequal even in nominally color-blind polities, and they had developed a vernacular
theorization of imperial citizenship as an ideal continually betrayed.
The imperial citizenship they believed theirs by right did not, for them or for any
other subject, legally exist—nor did “British citizenship” as a state-recognized cat-
egory. That did not stop British subjects from arguing about citizenship then, and
it has not stopped scholars from using the concept since. I begin this article by sur-
veying the many-layered scholarly literature on citizenship in Britain and beyond. I
then establish the Edwardian baseline from which interwar debates took off,
noting the role of race-based disparity in precluding formal codification of citizen-
ship, on the one hand, and the routine use of the term “citizen” by British West
Indians to recognize virtuous participants in the civic community, on the other. I
next address the impact on the circum-Caribbean migratory sphere of the hemi-
sphere-wide consolidation of mobility control in the 1920s, a process that confronted
sojourners in Panama, Cuba, the United States, and beyond with an implacable new
legal status under that same label, citizen. Turning back to the islands, I note the
accelerating invocation of citizens’ rights in the 1930s by reformers demanding pol-
itical rights within colonies, in part with explicit reference to race-based exclusion
abroad. Then I widen the view, showing that conflicts over who counted as citizens
echoed across Britannia’s realms in those years, the common aspirational term allow-
ing distant disputes to become evidence in local debates. Finally, I move forward a
decade to the immediate postwar era, analyzing the insights and blind spots of
ideas about citizenship offered by metropolitan intellectuals in precisely the years
when Caribbean labor migrants, for the first time, headed toward their governing
state’s home terrain.
Much of my analysis will rely on local newspapers published by and for British
West Indians of color, which flourished in the interwar years in rimland receiving
societies and island sending societies alike. Papers like the Grenada-based West
Indian, the Barbados Weekly Herald, the Panama Tribune, and the Searchlight from
Limón, Costa Rica, were each read by thousands of people, with subscribers near
and far.3 Impassioned readers’ letters about issues local and global, personal and
3 The (Bocas del Toro) Central American Express reported a circulation of 1,700 in 1917; the
(St. George’s, Grenada) West Indian, 1,600 in 1922; the Panama Tribune 3,500 in 1932; Marcus
Garvey’s (Kingston, Jamaica) Blackman, 2,000 in 1930. See Central American Express, 23 June 1917;
Grenada, Blue Book (Georgetown, 1922), 132; masthead, Panama Tribune, 6 November 1932, 1;
“Hearing of Trial for Seditious Libel,” Daily Gleaner, 15 February 1930, 9. The (Kingston, Jamaica)
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political filled their pages. This space was not limited to a small elite. Literacy among
working-class British West Indian emigrants was particularly high: 80 to 90 percent
in Panama and Costa Rica, and higher still in Harlem and Brooklyn.4 In these local
papers, mixed in among blood strengthener adverts and lodge meeting notes and dis-
avowals of straying spouses, sits a political corpus of uncommon interest.
SCHOLARLY CONTEXT
Recent decades have seen an outpouring of scholarship on the complexities of citi-
zenship within Great Britain and beyond—although what exactly scholars have
tracked under that label has varied significantly. The largest set of studies uses citizen-
ship as an analytic construct to designate the patterning of political membership and
civic participation within a given system. Those studying the history of citizenship in
this sense have argued that two normative visions coexisted in early twentieth-
century Britain: classical republican citizenship, understood with reference to the
ancient Greek model, centered on the obligation of active civic participation; and
liberal or “passive” citizenship, linked instead to the seventeenth-century English
Revolution and the Enlightenment, stressing individual freedoms and rights.5
Eugenia Low summarizes these alternative visions as a “conceptualization of citizen-
ship as a form of social virtue” and a “conceptualization of citizenship as an instru-
ment of equality.”6 Despite the nominal ascendance of the latter in British political
rhetoric by the middle third of the twentieth century, scholars suggest notions of pol-
itical belonging and entitlement based in duty and community, articulated and popu-
larized by turn-of-the-century idealist philosophers, continued to influence policy
making and popular reactions.7
The above scholarship focuses largely on the writings and speeches of intellectuals,
policymakers, and elites, although in some cases exploring the degree to which these
reached a wider (middlebrow) audience.8 In contrast, a second strand of scholarly
Daily Gleaner is digitized through newspaperarchive.com. All other periodicals quoted here were consulted
in microfilm, at the following repositories: Central American Express, Universidad de Panamá, Biblioteca
Central Simon Bolívar; Panama Tribune, New York Public Library; Searchlight, Biblioteca Nacional de
Costa Rica; all Trinidadian papers, National Archives of Trinidad and Tobago; Weekly Herald, National
Library Service of Barbados, Main Branch; West Indian, British Library Newspaper Reading Room,
Colindale.
4 Putnam, Radical Moves, 128–29; Lara Putnam, “Provincializing Harlem: The ‘Negro Metropolis’ as
Northern Frontier of an Interconnected Greater Caribbean,” Modernism/Modernity 20, no. 4 (November
2013).
5 Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, eds., Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race,
Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge, 2000), 57–70; Edmund Neill, “Conceptions of
Citizenship in Twentieth Century Britain,” Twentieth Century British History 17, no. 3 (2006): 424–38.
6 Eugenia Low, “The Concept of Citizenship in 20th Century Britain: Analysing Contexts of Develop-
ment,” in Reforming the Constitution, ed. Peter Catterall, Wolfgang Kaiser, and Ulrike Walton-Jordan
(London, 2000), 196.
7 Jose Harris, “‘Contract’ and ‘Citizenship,’” in The Ideas That Shaped Post-war Britain, ed. David Mar-
quand and Anthony Seldon (London, 1996), 122–38; Michael Freeden, “Civil Society and the Good
Citizen,” in Civil Society in British History, ed. Jose Harris (Oxford, 2003), 275–91.
8 E.g., Julia Stapleton, “Citizenship versus Patriotism in Twentieth-Century England,”Historical Journal
48, no. 1 (2005): 166.
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inquiry applies the rubric of citizenship to informal practices among the popular
classes, reading them as contestatory claims to belonging and rights. We see this per-
spective in recent studies ranging from “street citizenship” in Georgian London to
the boundaries of belonging during World War II.9
While scholarship on citizenship in Britain sometimes reads like a historiographi-
cal island unto itself, in fact, these academic trends (including the new emphasis on
popular claims making) are much wider. Among historians and historical sociologists
writing on Europe, the Americas, and beyond, analyses of evolving patterns of pol-
itical membership in terms of citizenship flowered in the 1990s and flourished in the
2000s.10 Authors in these decades often cited T. H. Marshall’s formulation as a
touchstone as they explored the role of popular organizing and pressure in expanding
rights. Palpable too is the influence of a Thompsonian view of popular agency: a
desire to find citizens present at their own making. The approach has proved particu-
larly fruitful for analyzing struggles over rights in postemancipation societies, where
commitments to republican virtues and liberal freedoms coexisted with coercion,
exclusion, and hierarchy.11 The disjuncture between the nominal commitments and
the reality of subjugation could, at times, scholars suggest, provide rallying
grounds or leverage for those seeking to make rights real.12
A separate set of scholarship—again, both within British studies and more
broadly—has traced the history of citizenship as a formal legal category, one
whose allocation regulates access to territory as well as rights. In essence, this scholar-
ship tracks citizenship as a category of (state) practice rather than using it as a cat-
egory of analysis.13 In most countries, by the interwar years, the regulation of
citizenship status had become tied to an array of bureaucratic and documentary pro-
cedures aimed at controlling entry and borders.14
9 Isaac Land, “Bread and Arsenic: Citizenship from the Bottom Up in Georgian London,” Journal of
Social History 39, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 89–110; Sonya Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citi-
zenship in Britain, 1939–1945 (Cambridge, 2003).
10 E.g., Charles Tilly, ed., Citizenship, Identity, and Social History (Cambridge, 1996); Rogers Brubaker,
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Evelyn Nakano Glenn,
Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor (Cambridge, MA,
2002); Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class and Citizenship
(Ithaca, 2006); Brodwyn M. Fischer, A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century
Rio de Janeiro (Stanford, CA, 2010).
11 Among many, see esp. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy
of Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ, 1996); Anthony W. Marx, “Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of
Racial Identity and Social Movements,” in Citizenship, Identity, and Social History, ed. Charles Tilly (Cam-
bridge, 1996), 159–84; Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explora-
tions of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); Alejandra
Bronfman, Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill,
NC, 2004). On women’s claims to citizenship in Jamaica, see Henrice Altink, Destined for a Life of
Service: Defining African-Jamaican Womanhood, 1865–1938 (Manchester, 2011), 151–200.
12 The flip side was that efforts by the privileged to insist on the inapplicability of republican/liberal prin-
ciples to the subjugated routinely drove vicious claims of racial difference. See foundational articulation in
Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia, orig. pub. 1975
(New York, 2003).
13 On categories of analysis and of practice, see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick J. Cooper, “Beyond
Identity,” Theory and Society 29 (2000): 1–47.
14 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, 1999);
Aristide Zolberg, “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy,” in The Handbook of International
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For historians of Britain, pursuing this story has meant explaining both the
absence of any formal category of “citizen” within the United Kingdom or empire
before the 1948 Nationality Act and the tumultuous array of subdivided citizenships
proffered in law since then.15 It also remits to both the regulation of mobility within
empire (largely before 1948) and the regulation of entry to Great Britain (largely
after 1948). In regard to mobility within empire, scholars highlight the nine-
teenth-century rise of demands for race-based protectionism from white working-
classes in the dominions and the dilemmas these presented for the rhetoric of
race-blind subjecthood so central to empire’s claimed legitimacy.16 In regard to the
latter—the control of access to Britain itself—the place of racism, whether elite or
popular, has been more disputed. Some historians have agued that racialist ideologies
identifying British belonging with whiteness were crucial drivers of policy shifts;
others see ethnocentrism or xenophobia rather than racism per se as the driver;
still others insist British laws exemplified race-blind liberalism, “conspiratorial
stories of . . . ‘racialisation’” not withstanding.17
Attending to the political ideas of British subjects of color on the move, the present
article brings the literatures on citizenship as patterned political belonging and citi-
zenship as popular claims making into dialogue with the literature on “citizen” as cat-
egory of state practice within hardened border regimes. How did the state-level shifts
through which international mobility control was remade at the dawn of the
twentieth century—ably detailed by Aristide Zolberg, Andreas Fahrmier, Adam
McKeown, and Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds—impact the ideas and identifi-
cations of the excluded? The literature on citizenship-as-popular-practice would
suggest that state making generates and is reshaped by resistance and claims
making. But in the making of migratory control, the key moves were often those
Migration, ed. Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind (New York, 2000), 71–93; Andreas
Fahrmeir, Olivier Faron, and Patrick Weil, eds., Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evol-
ution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-war Period
(Oxford, 2003); Andreas Fahrmier, Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven,
CT, 2008); Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders
(New York, 2008).
15 Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration
Law (London, 1990); Suzanne Shanahan, “Scripted Debates: Twentieth-Century Immigration and Citi-
zenship Policy in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States,” in Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring
States, ed. Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (Lanham, MD, 1999), 67–96; Rieko Karatani, Defining
British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain (London, 2003); Daniel Gorman, Imperial
Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester, 2006).
16 R. A. Huttenback, “The British Empire as a ‘White Man’s Country’: Racial Attitudes and Immigra-
tion Legislation in the Colonies of White Settlement,” Journal of British Studies 13, no. 1 (1973): 108–37;
Radhika Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility: History of the Passport,” Public Culture 11, no. 3 (1999):
527–55; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and
the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge, 2008).
17 For the first, see Kathleen Paul,Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (Ithaca,
NY, 1997); the second, Robin Cohen, Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others (London, 1994), and
Laura Tabili, “A Homogeneous Society? Britain’s ‘Internal Others,’ 1800–Present,” in At Home with the
Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (Cambridge,
2006), 53–76; the third, Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: The Insti-
tutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford, 2000), and Hansen, “British Citizenship After
Empire: A Defence,” Political Quarterly 71, no. 1 (2000): 47.
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of states far away. When state building imposes rules and curtails rights far from
home, does it still make sense to think of citizenship as in some meaningful way con-
structed “from below”? Do negotiation and struggle play any role in the story of citi-
zenship-as-legal-status? Has the making of citizenship-as-legal-status played any role
in popular claims to political voice?
Answering requires adjusting our sense of where history happens. My island-
outward tracking of citizenship claims among colonial subjects of color will reveal
important similarities to the dynamics other scholars have uncovered in Georgian,
Edwardian, and blitz-era London. But it will show that those dynamics took place
at a shifting set of sites, as is logical for people in motion. The nexus of mobility, pol-
itical voice, state membership, and race—the question of how to make empire stand
up for colored subjects abroad—was at the forefront of local debate in multiple
locales.
In sum, the present article expands existing work on British citizenship on the one
hand, and Commonwealth migration on the other. Scholarship in the 1990s on
postwar migration illuminated the complex interplay of imperial, national, and
racial identities.18 Recent contributions have turned to the study of nonwhite sub-
jects as authors rather than objects of identity formation, noting, for instance, the
alternative framings of Britishness by “Britishers” of color.19 The present article con-
tinues this attention to colonial subjects as active makers of meaning, but it shifts
focus from imperial and national belonging (and their cultural, class, and gendered
coordinates) to citizenship (and its material consequences). As we shall see, British
West Indian sojourners knew well that some would never recognize them as fully
British in a social or cultural sense. That did not stop them from asserting a moral
right to full membership in the imperial state.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: TRAVELING SUBJECTS AND LEGAL
CATEGORIES OF EMPIRE
The debates I will trace took place in a transnational migratory sphere created by the
travels of Jamaicans, Barbadians, and other British Caribbeans in the generations
after emancipation. It stretched from Venezuela’s Orinoco basin goldfields in the
southeast to the banana plantations and cacao groves of Central America in the
west, to Harlem’s crowded sidewalks in the north. Panama’s cities and canal works
18 E.g., Bill Schwarz, “‘The Only White Man in There’: The Re-racialisation of England, 1956–1968,”
Race & Class 38, no. 1 (1996): 65–78; Chris Waters, “‘Dark Strangers’ in Our Midst: Discourses of Race
and Nation in Britain, 1947–1963,” Journal of British Studies 36, no. 2 (1997): 207–38; Wendy Webster,
“‘There Will Always Be an England’: Representations of Colonial Wars and Immigration, 1948–1968,”
Journal of British Studies 40, no. 4 (2001): 557–84; more recently, Amy Whipple, “Revisiting the
‘Rivers of Blood’ Controversy: Letters to Enoch Powell,” Journal of British Studies 48, no. 3 (2009):
717–35.
19 David Killingray, “‘A Good West Indian, a Good African, and, in Short, a Good Britisher’: Black and
British in a Colour-Conscious Empire, 1760–1950,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36,
no. 3 (2008): 363–81; Ann Spry Rush, “Imperial Identity in Colonial Minds: Harold Moody and the
League of Coloured Peoples, 1931–1950,” Twentieth Century British History 13, no. 4 (2002): 356–83;
Marcus Collins, “Pride and Prejudice: West Indian Men in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain,” Journal of
British Studies 40, no. 3 (2001): 391–418.
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were the foremost destination in the first decade of the century, Cuba’s canefields fol-
lowed after the Great War, and New York City’s burgeoning service economy sur-
passed them in the 1920s. By the end of that decade, over 170,000 British West
Indies–born sojourners resided outside of British territory. That total does not
include those who had worked abroad and returned home or those who lost their
lives “in foreign.” Meanwhile, if we count not only island-born immigrants but
also their locally born children (or in some cases, by 1930, grandchildren), the size
of the British West Indian diaspora circa 1930 rises to over 300,000 (see map).20
The decade from 1924 onward saw antiblack immigration bans enacted by every
one of the significant receiving societies where those 300,000 dwelled—including
Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala,
Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the United Sates—as scientific racism
among national elites and protectionist demands by national workers converged to
make xenophobia an irresistible political platform.21All around theGreaterCaribbean,
20 The map reports foreign-born British West Indians based on census data. Numbers for multigenera-
tional community size reflect census data where it is available and contemporary estimates where it is not.
In cases where census data does not distinguish between British West Indians and other British subjects, or
between British West Indians and other Caribbean immigrants, I have estimated likely proportions based
on secondary literature and other primary sources. Clockwise from lower right: Venezuela, Ministerio de
Fomento, Dirección de Estadística, Sexto Censo de Población, 1936, vol. 3 (Caracas, 1940), 540. “Position of
British West Indians in Central and South American Countries,” 1932, The National Archives [henceforth
TNA], Colonial Series [henceforth CO] 318/406/2. Colombia, Contraloría General de la República,
Dirección del Censo,Memoria y cuadros del Censo de 1928 (Bogotá, 1930), 39. Panamá, Secretaría de Agri-
cultura y Obras Públicas, Dirección General del Censo, 1930 Censo Demográfico, vol. 1 (Panamá, 1931),
17, 21–23; “Memorandum regarding the British West Indian population on the Isthmus of Panama,” 6
December 1932, TNA, CO 318/408/3; Letter from Crosby, British Minister, Panama, 24 February
1932, TNA, CO 318/406/1; United States, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Report on Outlying
Territories and Possessions, 328, 334, 335. Costa Rica, Censo de Población de Costa Rica 1927, consulted at
http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr/. Honduras, Dirección General de Estadística, Resumen del censo general de
población, levantado el 29 de junio de 1930 (Tegucigalpa, 1932), 32. Nicaragua, Censo General de 1920
(Managua, n.d.), 4. Guatemala, Ministerio de Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística, Censo de la
población de la república, 1921, vol. 1 (Guatemala, 1924), 139; ibid., vol. 2, 57. Mexico, Censo de 1930,
Provincias de Tamaulipas, Yucatan, Veracruz, Quintana Roo; Sergio Camposortega, “Análisis demográfico
de las corrientes migratorias a México desde finales del siglo XIX,” in Destino México. Un estudio de las
migraciones asiáticas a México, siglos XIX y XX, coord. María Elena Ota Mishima (Mexico, 1997), 36–
37. Cuba, Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Memorias inéditas del Censo de 1931 (Havana, 1978), 74;
Cuba, Dirección General del Censo, Censo de 1943 (Havana, 1945), 888–89; Report to British Minister,
Havana, from Secretary of Immigrants, regarding work through Dec. 1928 and Letter from British Min-
ister, Havana, to Consul, Port au Prince, 27 December 1928, TNA, CO 318/394/3; Letter from British
Legation, Havana, 4 April 1932, TNA, CO 318/406/1; “Extract from Cuba Annual Report for 1931,”
1932, TNA, CO 318/406/2. Haiti, “Position of British West Indians in Central and South American
Countries,” 1932, TNA, CO 318/406/2. República Dominicana, Dirección General de Estadística Nacio-
nal, Sección del Censo, Población de la República Dominicana distribuida por nacionalidades. Cifras del censo
nacional de 1935 (Ciudad Trujillo, 1937), 2, 5: Letter from W. Gallienne, 16 September 1929, TNA, CO
318/394/3. United States, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, vol. 2, 33, 70, 231, 250, 255, 257,
512. Canada, James W. St. G. Walker, The West Indians in Canada, Booklet No. 6, Canada’s Ethnic Groups
(Ottawa, 1984), 8–9. Carlton Wilson, “A Hidden History: The Black Experience in Liverpool, England,
1919–1945” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1992), 202–07; Tabili, “A Homo-
geneous Society,” 70.
21 The United States and Cuba were the two partial exceptions to the pattern of explicit antiblack bans:
in each case, draconian action against black immigrants was carried out under new restrictive legislation
that did not mention the black race in particular. See Putnam, Radical Moves, 88–104; Putnam, “The
THEORIES OF RIGHTS AND THE STATE FROM THE INTERWAR CARIBBEAN ▪ 169
British West Indians found visas denied, bribes demanded, employment barred, and
family cut off at hundreds of sites they had previously called home. Interwar nativism
was not solely about race, but its racial coordinates were unmistakable. Nationalist
legislators explicitly named those of “black race” as “undesirable”; Britishers of color
were barred and vilified even as white Britishers remained welcome. As we will see,
British West Indian commentators read these events as part of a global pattern of
Map 1—British West Indian immigrants and total British West Indian community sizes, ca. 1930.
Drawn by Bill Nelson; data and design by Lara Putnam.
Making and Unmaking of the Circum-Caribbean Migratory Sphere: Mobility, Sex across Boundaries, and
Collective Destinies, 1840–1940,” inMigrants andMigration inModern North America: Cross-Border Lives,
Labor Markets, and Politics in Canada, the Caribbean, Mexico, and the United States, ed. Dirk Hoerder and
Nora Faires (Durham, NC, 2011), 99–128.
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white supremacist state making.Within the global panorama they sketched, color bars
within empire formed bitter touchstones, from the immigration laws of Australia and
Canada to the treatment of black seamen in British ports after the war.
The challenge of squaring the rhetoric of race-blind, egalitarian subjecthood with a
colonial system dependent on deep inequality was not, of course, new in the 1920s.
Indeed, this underlying dynamic contributed to the failure to create either “British
citizen” or “imperial citizen” as a formal status before 1948. Rather, the populaces
of the United Kingdom, the dominions, and the dependent colonies were by law
British subjects (the nonwhite among them sometimes specified as “non-European
British subjects”), while the populaces of the empire’s other territories were classed
as British Protected Persons.22
The absence of a “citizen” status was out of step with modern state norms, but it
persisted for a reason. In the Imperial Conference of 1911, Home Secretary Winston
Churchill called for formalization of “a uniform and world-wide status of British citi-
zenship which shall protect the holder of that certificate wherever he may be.”23 But
how could such a status be applied only to white British subjects—as Churchill clearly
intended—without making racial barriers explicit? The procedural challenge echoed
a policy dilemma that repeatedly enmeshed Whitehall between dominion legislatures
and the broader empire. Australia, Canada, and South Africa kept insisting on
banning the entry of nonwhite migrants, even those with unquestioned status as
British subjects, and nonwhite British subjects kept insisting on objecting. Any pro-
posed imperial citizenship would need to reconcile citizenship’s promise of the right
of abode with the continuance of race-based exclusion.
A 1912 debate among one imperial discussion circle explored the questions raised
by Churchill’s proposal. The former governor of New Zealand called for a straight-
forward race-based bar: “In my view full British citizenship, ‘good’ for any and every
part of the Empire and entitled to recognition by foreign States, cannot be given to
British subjects of colour.” In contrast, he continued, all individuals of “pure white
stock” should have easy access to “full British citizenship,” be it from birth or, for
foreign-born whites, through naturalization after brief residence.24 Such an open
enunciation of race was rare among the administrators of empire. Far more
common was the forbearance exemplified by Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who
acknowledged obliquely that “certain categories of British subjects” faced “special
disabilities as regards franchise, admission to certain portions of the Empire, and
so forth,” but insisted “it would be a grave mistake to label British subjects who
suffer under such disabilities, with a name, connoting inferiority, different to that
borne by their fellow-citizens: to say to them, in effect, ‘You are not a British
citizen; you are only a subject.’”25 Another contributor, carefully disclaiming “any
22 See Gorman, Imperial Citizenship, 19–24.
23 Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911 (London, 1911), 256, http://www.archive.
org/details/1911minutesofpro00impeuoft (accessed 31 October 2013).
24 Lord Plunket, sometime governor of New Zealand, in British Citizenship: A discussion initiated by E B
Sargant, and reprinted by permission from the Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute (“United Empire”)
(New York, Bombay, and Calcutta, 1912), 11. http://www.archive.org/stream/britishcitizensh00sarguoft
(accessed 31 October 2013). See discussion in Gorman, Imperial Citizenship, 19–24.
25 Walter Hely-Hutchinson, sometime governor of Windward Islands, Natal, and Cape Colony, in
British Citizenship, 18–19.
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intent” to enter into debate over policies under which “the coloured man is held to be
unwelcome,” nevertheless acknowledged forthrightly that race was the crux of the
issue, explaining, “British citizenship can carry no general meaning or value as
long as any British subjects,” on grounds like “complexion,” “can be legally
refused admittance into, and domicile in, any portion of the British empire.”26
As their deliberations made clear, the ambiguities surrounding “imperial,”
“British,” or other subsets of “citizenship” within empire stemmed not from Great
Britain’s lack of a written constitution but from the utility of ambiguity itself. At
the end of the day, the debate’s convener summed up, the diverse local laws and
regulations that could be said to comprise implicit imperial citizenship drew “a
much broader distinction between persons of European and non-European
descent than between subject and alien.”27 This was not a truth empire’s boosters
could speak.
CITIZENSHIP IN TRANSIT IN THE GREATER CARIBBEAN: ATTAINABLE
MERIT VERSUS IMPLACABLE CREDENTIAL
Nevertheless, if a good portion of the men who ran the empire presumed “British
subjects of colour” to be categorically excluded from citizenship, a good portion of
those subjects never doubted that citizenship was theirs. Among English-speaking
Afro-Caribbeans, as among English speakers across the anglophone world,
“citizen” had long been used to denote meritorious membership in the local commu-
nity. For instance, since the mid-nineteenth century, parish-specific “Citizens’ Associ-
ations” in Jamaica had hosted speakers and sponsored civic initiatives. Newspapers in
Jamaica and Trinidad often carried complaints about the need to safeguard “respect-
able citizens” or “peaceful citizens” from this or that noisy urban nuisance.28 This
usage implied no state sanction, and it continued as British West Indians settled in
lands far from home, where there was no question that the governing states
considered them foreigners rather than members. Thus, a Jamaican-run newspaper
in Bocas del Toro, Panama, described one local as a “native of Portland, Jamaica,
who left Jamaica since 1904 via Costa Rica, thence to Colon and then to
Bocas in the year 1905 [and] was settled here as a law abiding citizen until
1916.”29 Meanwhile, on islands and rimlands alike, those concerned with child
welfare often argued for their charges as “the citizens of tomorrow”; as one
enthusiast in a British West Indian settlement in Costa Rica explained in 1930,
“[G]ood boy scouts in a locality is a sign of good citizenship among the rising
generations.”30
As these examples suggest, the term “citizen” conveyed well-earned merit and
public respect. As such, it was particularly resonant for those arguing that character
transcended racial divides. A 1917 editorial from Bocas del Toro urged the
26 Cavendish Boyle, governor of Mauritius, in British Citizenship, 20.
27 E. B. Sargant, in British Citizenship, 44.
28 E.g., “Scenes and Sights in Metropolis by Night,” Daily Gleaner, 22 September 1922, 3; “Round the
Town,” (Port of Spain) Weekly Guardian, 27 March 1920, 1.
29 Letter to editors from “The Lagoon,” Central American Express, 29 September 1917, n.p.
30 “Estrada,” Searchlight, 12 April 1930, 1.
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“Labouring West Indians” who had written to denounce their mistreatment on a
United Fruit banana plantation to take their complaint straight to the top:
Our people should not cringe whenever a question of right is concerned—nor at any
other time. They should be respectful, and bold. Don’t be afraid to approach Mr.
Kyes, because he is a white man: besides being a white man, he is a gentleman. “A
blooded white man hates a cringing citizen, be he black or white and he admires
manhood, self-respect and courage in a Negro as much as he does in an Englishman,
a Frenchman, or a German.”31
As we shall see, the twinned reference to citizenship and manhood would continue to
be a mainstay of Afro-Caribbean men’s self-assertion. But the claim that white power
brokers valued character over race would be disproven in loud lawmaking and silent
betrayals alike over the following decades.
Meanwhile, Caribbeans sometimes demanded civil liberties in the name of their
rights as “British citizens.” A 1904 article in a Grenadian paper denounced misrule
in Trinidad by asking, “Are the people of that island entitled to the immunities of
British citizens? or are they to be governed as a horde of rebels who must be butch-
ered by a mad and infuriated soldiery so as to be kept in order?”32 The questions were
intended to be rhetorical: the rights stood as moral entitlements even as local officials
betrayed them. Sixteen years later, spooked by island labor unrest and seeking to ban
Marcus Garvey’s Negro World and other race-conscious publications, colonial auth-
orities rushed “Seditious Publications Ordinances” through legislatures across the
region.Working-class protesters fruitlessly invokedmultiple rights-bearing traditions
that the ordinance betrayed: the law was “not only obviously unnecessary, but un-
English”; it “threaten[ed] the rights and privileges of the people of the colony,”
removing “our rightful freedom as British subjects” and “loyal subjects of the
King.”33 In response, the attorney general insisted that he recognized the people
of Trinidad as “in every way worthy citizens,” although (he underlined elsewhere)
they were deeply ignorant and dangerously easy to mislead. The legislation was
pushed through.34
What we see here and elsewhere is that civil liberties could be defended as “citi-
zens’” rights, but were they equally or more likely to be supported with reference
to national tradition and allegiance to the Crown. In contrast, when the question
at stake was moral “worth,” the term citizen was the natural frame, conveying
earned merit rather than inherent rights. Reference to citizenship, in other words,
was for British Caribbeans deeply resonant with the republican/active model of citi-
zenship promoted by Victorian and Edwardian idealists who saw civic participation
as a transcendent ethic; it was also linked, but less integrally or uniquely so, to the
liberal/passive vision of political membership centered on individual rights rather
than on communal virtue.
31 “Laboring West Indians of the Lagoon,” Central American Express, 30 June 1917, 3.
32 “‘The Federalist and Grenada People’ on ‘The Port of Spain Gazette,’” (Port of Spain) Daily Mirror,
1 September 1904, 2.
33 Debates in the Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago (Hansards), January–December 1920 (Port of
Spain, 1921), 5 March 1920, 38–39.
34 Ibid., 41.
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International trends would soon put the protections due nonwhite subjects on trial
in newly public and visible ways. Imperial lawmakers had ducked the question of
formal citizenship’s boundaries, but now other states were calling the question. As
noted above, the years after the Great War saw the consolidation of a widely
shared shift. Welfare states and border regimes were each in the making. Nation-
states systematized birth certificates, passports, and visas, and began to make
access to employment and nascent social services contingent on these documentary
proofs of belonging.35
In this new international system, “citizenship” was not a portmanteau term for
civic virtue but a requisite component of individual identity, which only state
action conferred. Sojourners sensed rumblings afoot. In January 1919, one British
West Indian worker in the Canal Zone wrote to the British consul in Colón, “Is it
true that by the termination of the war the status of the British subjects have been
changed, and that we are no longer British subjects but citizens of Britain?” The
consul seemed blithely confident in response: “There is no foundation whatever
for the supposition that the status of British subjects will be changed as a result of
the War.”36 But while the formalities of empire had not changed, international
practices of governance were changing, in ways that would impact British subjects’
status, like it or not.
“EMIGRATION OF JAMAICANS TO U.S. STOPPED,” ran the banner head-
line of Kingston’s Daily Gleaner just five years later, as the local impact of the restric-
tionist US Johnson-Reed Act became suddenly, frighteningly clear. “The American
Consul has received instructions not to visae any more passports and thus only Amer-
ican citizens will be able to go North.”37 “Citizen” as used in this sentence reflected
nothing of local standing or civic worth. It was a legal status that states and only states
could confer: within the emergent regime of visas and passports, without documen-
tary proof that citizenship had been conferred it did not exist. Lacking citizenship, a
visa was required for entry; lacking a visa, entry was denied. The Johnson-Reed Act
brought the “non-self-governing” colonies of the Americas (e.g., the West Indies but
not Canada) under quota-limited visa status for the first time, and the “quota control
officer” at the US consulate in London cut visa allocation to the British West Indies
to a trickle. Over 10,000 Afro-Caribbeans had entered the United States in the first
six months of 1924; fewer than 250 did so under the British quota in the entirety of
1925.38
35 Fahrmier, Citizenship; Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and
Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,”Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–
34.
36 Letter from J. A. Phillips, Balboa Heights, CZ, to Mallet, 28 January 1919, TNA, Foreign Office
Series 288/200.
37 “Emigration of Jamaicans to U.S. Stopped,” Daily Gleaner, 14 June 1924, 1. See Lara Putnam,
“Unspoken Exclusions: Race, Nation, and Empire in the Immigration Restrictions of the 1920s in
North America and the Greater Caribbean,” in Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in
Labor History, ed. Leon Fink (New York, 2011), 267–93.
38 United States, Bureau of Immigration, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to
the Secretary of Labor for the fiscal year ended . . . June 30, 1925 (Washington, DC, 1925), 62, 151. See Lara
Putnam, “The Ties Allowed to Bind: Kinship Legalities and Migration Restriction in the Interwar Amer-
icas,” International Labor and Working-Class History 83 (Spring 2013): 191–209.
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Citizenship in this new sense was not negotiated between popular and legal under-
standings. Citizenship as restrictive right of abode could be legislated in Washington,
regulated from London, and fracture families in Panama and Cuba without the
restrictors having to negotiate anything—or even acknowledge that discrimination
against colonials of color was under way.
Newspapers published by and for British Caribbeans abroad in the late 1920s and
1930s reflect both the continued usage of “citizen” to reference the standing con-
ferred by community participation and the new meaning of “citizen” as a legal cat-
egory governing mobility. Thus, a widower in 1930 Limon denounced the fraternal
lodges that had failed to give his wife the funeral owed her “as a mark of respect to an
old respectable citizen.”39 The same newspapers carried extensive coverage of new
requirements regarding registration, passports, and visas; of race-based bans near
and far; and of the travails of individuals who for lack of papers found themselves
with “No Nationality” and therefore no port of entry open to them.40
The fraught new politics of territorial belonging made civic participation more
vital than ever. So preached Sidney Young, the Jamaica-born founder of the
Panama Tribune and a tireless crusader for the rights of British West Indians in
Panama. Fighting the erosion of civil rights by the xenophobic populism sweeping
the region required active engagement at multiple levels, Young insisted: community
solidarity and economic self-help, assertion within empire, and supranational black
solidarity.41 In steps from 1926 to 1928, the Panamanian legislature declared all
those “of black race whose native language is not Spanish” undesirable aliens and
limited their entry, employment, and jus soli citizenship. Mass statelessness threa-
tened. As British doctrine held, and local British diplomats gleefully (in private) con-
firmed, the two-thirds of locally born British West Indian children whose parents
were not legally wed had no claim to British subject status.42 How to ensure the
future of these young men and women occupied hundreds of columns of ink in
the newspaper sections Young published from the late 1920s onward.
Disputes over citizenship-as-state-status threatened to disrupt the forging of “citi-
zens of tomorrow” in the rimlands—but not if Sidney Young could help it. Respond-
ing to outcry in the Panamanian press in 1932 over local British West Indian boy
scouts’ use of the Union Jack in drills and ceremonies, Young reviewed the new
panorama of laws governing “Panamanian citizenship” and the transmission of
what Young termed “British citizenship” (that which British law deemed British sub-
jecthood). Above all, Young exhorted, the vital project of scouting must not be put
on hold until the fraught issues of national belonging were resolved, for what scout-
ing offered was “training for usefulness as citizens and men,” more vital now than
39 Letter to the editor, “Unbrotherly Feelings,” Searchlight, 21 June 1930, 3.
40 E.g., “No Nationality,” Searchlight, 19 September 1931, 4.
41 See Lara Putnam, “‘Nothing Matters But Color’: Transnational Circuits, the Interwar Caribbean, and
the Black International,” in From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution, ed.
Michael O. West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009), 107–29; Putnam,
“Sidney Adolphus Young,” inDictionary of Caribbean and Afro-Latin American Biography, ed. Henry Louis
Gates Jr. and Franklin W. Knight (Oxford, forthcoming); Putnam, Radical Moves, 135, 142–45, 200–02.
42 Despatch from Crosby, Panama, 28 November 1932, TNA, CO 318/408/3. See Lara Putnam,
“Eventually Alien: The Multigenerational Saga of British West Indians in Central America and Beyond,
1880–1940,” in Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place, ed. Lowell Gudmundson
and Justin Wolfe (Durham, NC, 2010), 288–96.
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ever.43 The idea that citizenship as moral character transcended nationality was
underlined the following week by local Scout Commissioner Clifford Bolt, who
wrote that as he and others had founded scout troops over the past decade in
Panama, “[t]he question of nationality did not seriously occupy our attention, we
were working for the benefit of our future men and endeavoring to make citizens
fit for any country when they come to the age of maturity.”44 Citizenship here
required communal roots but had cosmopolitan results: citizens must be made but
would be “fit for any country.” Yet to fight state-mandated exclusion with civic par-
ticipation was a battle of unequal arms.
“Why such animosity?” asked the editors of the (Limón) Searchlight in 1931, sur-
veying the “hostile movements” threatening “coloured British subjects” around the
region. “Cuba has had her turn, Honduras has had hers, Panama has had hers, Vene-
zuela has had hers, Colombia also has put on the twitch, and now some sons of Costa
Rica are thinking likewise.”45 The question of the status of the next generation was
critical. Some receiving societies (like Panama) revoked birthright citizenship in these
years, while others, like Costa Rica, had never recognized it—a legal reality not yet
clear on the ground. In this same article, the Searchlight editors declared it impossible
to expel the “industrious coloured residents in Costa Rica,” long settled, with “their
own farms and houses as well as grown up children in this country who are all citizens
of the Republic.” In fact, Costa Rican law accorded those children no such status.46
Indeed, despite the savvy born of necessity, the editors and correspondents of the
rimland papers made assertions about legal citizenship that were patently wrong, if
understood as descriptions of the documentary regime now surrounding them.
Their claims suggest a persistent moral economy of territorial rights that infused
elements of the established notion of citizenship as civic merit into the new and
intransigent legal term. Thus, in 1930 the Limon papers denounced Costa Rican
government discrimination in public works hiring, which froze out “unfortunate
people who actually form (whether by birth or length of years of residence) joint citi-
zenship here.”47 Another article urged those heading back to Jamaica to “avail them-
selves of their necessary papers to prove themselves long citizens of this Country”—
Costa Rica—before departure, lest they find themselves unable to reenter Costa Rica
if they wished.48 But, in fact, neither long residence nor local birth “actually” con-
veyed Costa Rican citizenship, and no such thing as “joint citizenship” existed.
Costa Rican citizenship could only be claimed through formal registration or
formal naturalization, procedures only a tiny fraction of British West Indians living
there pursued in this era.49 The notion that long residence conveyed at least partial
43 Editorial, “The Future of the Boy Scouts,” Panama Tribune, 30 October 1932, 8.
44 Clifford Bolt, “Making Good Citizens,” Panama Tribune, 16 October 1932, 15. For more on scout-
ing in interwar Panama, see Lara Putnam, “To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic
World,” Journal of Social History 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 615–30.
45 “Why Such Animosity?” Searchlight, 22 August 1931, 1.
46 See Diana Senior Angulo, “La incorporación social en Costa Rica de la población afrocostarricense
durante el siglo XX, 1927–1963” (master’s thesis, Universidad de Costa Rica, 2007); Putnam, “Eventually
Alien,” 296–99.
47 “Unjust discrimination at Siquirres,” Searchlight, 28 June 1930, 1.
48 “Our Unemployed,” Searchlight, 8 February 1930, 4.
49 See Senior Angulo, “Incorporación social.”Dual citizenship would not be legally recognized in Costa
Rica until the 1990s.
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entitlement to things increasingly restricted by formal national membership—things
like employment, aid when destitute, and a right of abode—was heard frequently
among circum-Caribbean migrants in this era. Just as frequently it was squashed
by state authorities.
DIFFERENTIATED SUBJECTHOOD AND THE DUTY OF PATRIOTIC
DISSENT
Facing bars and mistreatment abroad, British West Indians demanded the formal
protection of the state to which they nominally belonged, the British imperial
state. In theory, there was no doubt they were entitled to it: extending protection
to crown subjects in foreign lands, whatever their ancestry, formed part of the
empire’s raison d’être according to long tradition and copious rhetoric.50 In 1921,
the (near-white, elite) editors of Kingston’s Daily Gleaner could trumpet the protec-
tive value to “the Jamaican abroad”—in Cuba and Panama, in this case—of “his
British citizenship”: “He is loyal by sentiment, he is also loyal because he recognizes
that British citizenship is of real and sterling value.”51 A decade later and seven
hundred miles to the west, that protection looked far less sterling. The lack of
support from consuls and colonial officials for “the Coloured Britisher” in contrast
to the “englishman” abroad was egregious, wrote the Searchlight editors from
Costa Rica in 1930. State after state enacted race-based bans on entry (Panama,
Nicaragua, and Colombia) and employment (Costa Rica and Cuba), “and with all
this prejudicial discrimination of the coloured subjects of the king in foreign parts,
no protest is entered or suggested by the Consuls to Downing Street for the protec-
tion of his subjects.”52 Some Crown representatives went further than sins of omis-
sion and publicly differentiated on the basis of race, “assert[ing] that they are not here
to attend to coloured British subjects, only the British Shipping and Englishmen.”53
British West Indian commentators treated this as both common and appalling. If
state agents declined to back rights in an era when state backing meant all, “what
benefit does the black race obtain from being under the British Crown at home or
abroad?”54
The term “citizen,” carrying the affective charge of its older sense as meritorious
civic membership alongside its new meaning as state-allocated status, served to
denounce the betrayal with particular force. A 1924 editorial by Barbados-born,
Panama-raised Eric Walrond in the Panama Workman suggested that while Latin
American nativism was comprehensible, imperial silence in the face of “[a]buse,
malignity and violence” was portentous. “How do West Indians stand in Central
America? This question concerns the British Empire more than it does the Latin
American Republics. The outspoken and evident antagonism to British West
Indians is not only outrageous to the sufferers, but an insult to the British
50 For instance, none of the participants in the 1912 debate over British citizenship, cited above, dis-
puted this. See also discussion in Putnam, Radical Moves, 41–42, 147.
51 Editorial, “Their Point of View,” Daily Gleaner, 20 October 1921, 6.
52 “James Graham handed to Cuban Police and British Protection,” Searchlight, 9 August 1930, 3.
53 “British Protection,” Searchlight, 1 February 1930, 2.
54 “James Graham handed to Cuban Police and British Protection,” Searchlight, 9 August 1930, 3.
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Government of which these people are bona fide citizens.”55 This declaration of
“bona fide citizen” status, like the discussion of “joint citizenship” above, willfully
ignored the fact that the legal status asserted was denied by the state empowered
to grant it. In 1924, Walrond concluded with a confident peroration that “the
British Government should become actively conscious of its responsibility to
protect the citizens of the empire in foreign lands.”56 Seven years later, the Searchlight
editors reviewed a worsening panorama of bans and exclusions in the same lands and
ended not with confidence but a question, one that named racism explicitly as the
problem: “what is the attitude of the British government toward her Negro
Citizens?”57
Empire was betraying empire’s core virtues. Patriotism demanded action. “Crom-
well, Toussaint L’Overture and the parliamentarians who forced John of Gaunt to
sign the Magna Charta were all ardent patriots, yet they vigorously opposed the
modus operandi of their governments when the necessity warranted it,” reminded
a letter writer in Panama in 1927, asserting an unquestioned moral membership
that carried the duty to criticize from within. “Intelligent West Indians need not
cover themselves with the Union Jack to prove their nationality. They need not
resort to cheap advertisements or blatant proclamations to be known as British.
We are British at heart, British in culture.”58 That national character was indelible,
the author argued, in a way that neither state credentials nor bodily features could
be: “A man’s flag, his name, his very features might be changed but his culture is
the very ego.”59 Loyal Britishers, he wrote, must denounce the immigration laws
of Canada and Australia, the exploitation in South Africa and Kenya, and the betrayal
of black soldiers in England. “Intelligent West Indians do not forget their duty to the
Empire . . . but they also have not forgotten that they are a colored people.”60
Surveying racial distinction at the outskirts of empire—the widening gap between
“West Indians” and “British” subjects in Panama, and the failures of consuls in
Cuba—Sidney Young concluded the time for silent dependence was over. “In
matters affecting the righting of our wrongs, it is we who must first protest,” he
wrote. “We cannot sit supinely lamenting our woes, and leaving everything to the
representatives of the king . . . and to those super-patriots who may cry ‘treason’
at our statements; we declare in the words of Patrick Henry, the American patriot:
‘If this be treason, make the most of it.’”61 Individual rights required collective
protest; making membership real required risking treason. Young’s model of political
belonging did not split duties from rights or civic life from equal treatment: it posited
the former as crucial steps in achieving the latter.
Against this panorama, political voice within colonies of origin took on a new
valence. We turn now to the islands and observe the accelerating use of “citizenship”
to describe rights unconstrained by race or privilege.
55 “West Indian Labourers in the Republics: A Practical Issue,” Daily Gleaner, 5 September 1924, 3.
56 Ibid.
57 “Why Such Animosity?” Searchlight, 22 August 1931, 1.
58 Letter to the editor, “Correspondence: The Question of Loyalty and Patriotism,” Panama American,
9 January 1927, West Indian page.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Sidney A. Young, “Fighting for Ourselves,” Panama Tribune, 19 July 1931, 8.
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CITIZENS OF THE WORLD AND CITIZENS OF TOMORROW: ISLAND
REFORMERS AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
In the West Indian’s opening editorial in 1915, Grenadian editor T. A. Marryshow
laid out his paper’s mission: to serve as “an untrammelled advocate of popular
rights . . . an unswerving educator of the people in their duties as subjects of the
State and citizens of the world.”62 Capturing that twinned vision of “popular
rights” and “duties,” the category of citizen suffused Marryshow’s pages, not only
in exhortations to future “citizens of the world,” but also as the default term for
local residents in the context of discussions of governance. We read routinely here
of “the better interests of the citizens as a whole,” “the treatment of an individual
citizen,” and so forth. In 1915, Marryshow brooked no doubt that the expanded
rights and duties his fellow citizens deserved could be sought within empire.
Indeed, he described imperial Britain as like imperial Rome before it: the world’s
best hope for a polity that transcended color or creed. As the decade advanced, his
faith in empire’s immunity to racism was shaken. Only electoral reform, he con-
cluded, could create the leverage needed to curve empire toward its potential.
Barbadian journalist ClennellWickham agreed. In themid-1920s,Wickham’sWeekly
Herald championed the Democratic League, a new opposition party struggling to
break the grip of white planters on Barbados’s House of Assembly.63 Reformers
called for freedom of political speech, a broader franchise, investment in education
and public health, and at least minimally protective labor laws. They made the case
through constant reference to the rights of “citizens”—which, they insisted, all Barba-
dians were. In their renderings, the term undergirded claims to political rights zealously
denied them by local elites. “Representative Government”was Barbadians’ “birthright”
as “British citizens,” wrote one correspondent. That island elites currently deprived
them of that birthright did not abrogate the underlying status. Citizenship derived
from community membership. It could be ignored and insulted, but never erased.
A man, or woman, is a citizen of the town or district to which he or she belongs. He is a
citizen of the United Kingdom, enjoying the advantages of its freedom and government
and fulfilling the duties or bearing the responsibilities which are common to its people.
He is a citizen of the British Empire. Hence belonging to Bridgetown, Christchurch, St
Philip etc., one is a citizen in any of the circumstances, no matter how the local laws
might be abridged; so long as he enters his claim.64
The moral brief for inalienable citizenship as concentric belonging, grounded in
duties and securing freedoms, was crystal clear. How one’s “claim” was to be
“entered” in the teeth of local laws was less so.
The argument that popular citizenship demanded political rights and social invest-
ment for Barbados’s black masses putWickham and the Democratic League on a col-
lision course with the island’s plantocracy. The “callous indifference and naked greed
62 “Foreword,” West Indian, 1 January 1915, 2.
63 F. A. Hoyos, “Inniss andWickham,”Our Common Heritage (Bridgetown, Barbados, 1953), 142–47;
Keith Hunte, “The Struggle for Political Democracy: Charles Duncan O’Neal and the Democratic
League,” in The Empowering Impulse: The Nationalist Tradition of Barbados, ed. Glenford Howe and
Don Marshall (Mona, Jamaica, 2001), 133–48.
64 Letter to the editor, “Some Views on Government,” Weekly Herald, 21 February 1925, 3.
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of the wealthier classes” imposed “poverty, nakedness and disease,” according to one
letter writer. “They think it is no dishonour that our future citizens should be bred
and rared like pigs in foul and overcrowded hovels.”65 However, those future citizens
would not suffer in silence forever, wrote another, self-described as a member of the
enfranchised few. “The desire for political recognition by the masses strikes a deep
note like the distant booming of a heavy swell,” and the privileged could not
expect loyalty if all they offered was intransigence. “There can be no desire on our
part to have them true citizens without granting the status of citizens,” he warned,
“If we fail it will be our fault when they become something else.”66 “True citizens”
here meant loyal members of the polity; the “status of citizens” meant political
rights within it. Passionate organizing won incremental change. The Democratic
League finally elected several of its own to the House of Assembly in 1930, an unpre-
cedented blow, wrote T. A. Marryshow from Grenada, against those white Barba-
dians who believed they had “inherited from their illustrious ancestors the right to
regulate and ration a people’s privileges of citizenship.”67 Marryshow’s insistence
on the “privileges of citizenship” that no one, however illustrious, had the right to
“ration,” still presented these as British rights due Caribbeans as British subjects.
Yet gazing out at the region more broadly, it was hard to trust empire as the
answer, for the rights of sojourners abroad were matters of high politics. And
here, Britain was failing her subjects of color.68
For instance, in 1932 Sidney Young’s Panama Tribune covered at length the Cana-
dian National Steamship Company’s firing of 350 British West Indian seamen “on
the ground of helping Canada’s unemployed.” The Tribune first quoted the Port of
Spain Daily Mirror, voice of that island’s near-white merchants, which lamented
the firings with reference to bilateral economic issues: trade relations and shipping
subsidies. Then the Tribune quoted Marryshow’s West Indian, which framed the
event quite differently: as a matter of the rights of subjects of color within empire.
As with the rimland press above, Marryshow here used the term “British citizens”
to hammer home both the ideal of unity symbolized by flag and allegiance, and
the betrayal of that ideal by racist differentiation.
In many respects the West Indian is nobody’s child. Theoretically a citizen of the might-
iest Empire the world has ever seen, he has only to put his claims to the test to find that
between theory and actuality there is a wide and unbridgeable gulf fixed. Every day in
every way the West Indian is made to feel that he is not as other men are, even in the
Empire of which he is a part.
Generations of hard working people have poured the results of their labour into the
coffers of haughty English aristocrats. The British Empire can never repay its debts to
these little tropical isles in the broad Atlantic.
And yet the people born and bred under the shadow of the flag and owning allegiance
to no other, are frequently denied their place among other British citizens; frequently
65 “The Democratic League, Its Policy and Creed,” Weekly Herald, 28 March 1925, 4.
66 Letter to the editor, “Some Phases in Our Politics,” Weekly Herald, 30 May 1925, 3.
67 “The Bell Has Struck in Barbados,” West Indian, 9 February 1930, 4.
68 See also, among many, Clennell Wickham, “The Problem of the Distribution of the World’s Peoples,”
Weekly Herald, 14 March 1925, 4.
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they find that the alien is far more acceptable to their own flag relations than
themselves.69
We see here both the role of circum-Caribbean editors of color in fostering debate
over racism within empire and the ascendance within these particular papers by the
1930s of a discourse of imperial citizenship as ideal betrayed.
Like Clennell Wickham and T. A. Marryshow, others in this era linked political
rights within colonies to mobility and employment rights abroad. Lacking political
voice within empire, they argued, West Indians were “nobody’s child”—human
beings without a backing state to substantiate their claims to basic protections.
When Venezuela in 1930 began enforcing a law barring entry to all people “of
black race,” Port of Spain municipal councilor Tito Achong put the lack of state
backing front and center.
Just as the Searchlight editors the following year would ask “what is the attitude of
the British government toward her Negro Citizens?” Achong proclaimed that he and
others “were primarily concerned about evaluating their rights as citizens of the
British Empire.” The evaluation was grim. Venezuelans in Trinidad “had the same
domicillary rights as natives of Trinidad who had no rights of citizenship.” Lack of
mobility rights abroad compounded the lack of economic rights on the island:
“West Indians were excluded from places abroad and at home. Foreigners were
given the best jobs and West Indians had to work as day laborers.” As the deputy
mayor tried to cut him off for “straying from the subject,” Achong named the
racial coordinates of imperial rightlessness: “Venezuelans were citizens of Venezuela,
whether white or black. AWest Indian must be a negro with no rights.”70 In a single
declamation, Achong had called for evaluation of West Indians’ “rights as citizens”
within empire and laid bare both their de jure lack of citizenship and their de facto
lack of political, economic, and mobility rights. Here as elsewhere, talk of citizenship
within empire both declared a moral claim to race-blind state backing and measured
the weight of its absence.
Increasingly it was as self-proclaimed citizens rather than as self-described loyal
subjects that colonials of color framed their pursuit of rights, even beyond the
pages of the press. In the mid-1930s, Indo-Trinidadian activist Adrian Cola Rienzi
founded first the “Citizens Welfare League” and later the “Trinidad Citizens
League,” while on the same island Grenada-born organizer T. U. B. Butler named
his (1936) movement the “British Empire Citizens’ and Workers’ Home Rule
Party.” The term “citizen” conveyed the goal of transforming civic participation
into formal political voice. The word, too, grounded that claim in race-blind political
belonging rather than the culturalist or communitarian claims around which others
in the same era were attempting to rally—separately—Trinidad’s East Indian and
Afro-Creole masses.71 It is not happenstance that Rienzi and Butler both sought
to mobilize followers across lines of race and ethnicity, fellow citizens all.
69 “Protest Actions of Canadians Ousting W.I. Seamen,” Panama Tribune, 23 October 1932, 3.
70 “Trinidad Protests against Venezuela Ban on West Indians,” Daily Gleaner, 14 October 1930, 10. See
Putnam, Radical Moves, 206–07.
71 Sahadeo Basdeo, “Indian Participation in Labour Politics in Trinidad, 1919–1939,” Caribbean Quar-
terly 32, no. 3/4 (1986): 50–65; Kelvin Singh, “Conflict and Collaboration: Tradition and Modernizing
Indo-Trinidadian Elites (1917–56),” New West Indian Guide 70, no. 3/4 (1996): 229–53.
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Given these trends, we should not be surprised that in 1937 it was as self-described
“citizens of Port-of-Spain” that members of the “Friends of Ethiopia Committee”
demanded His Majesty’s Government hear both “our claim for increased represen-
tation on the Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago” and “our continued indig-
nation over the treatment of Ethiopia and Ethiopians,” so contrary to British
“obligations, as a member of the League of Nations.”72 What had Port of Spain
civic life to do with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Trinidadian
legislative reform, on the other? Everything. Political rights had local, regional,
imperial, and international dimensions, as these “citizens of the world,” “bona fide
citizens,” “true citizens,” and “Negro citizens of empire”—who were legal citizens
of no state at all—knew full well.
CITIZENS OF EMPIRE: INTERCOLONIAL OBSERVATION OF RACIAL
BARS TO FULL RIGHTS
By the late 1920s the terms “citizen of empire,” “imperial citizen,” or, when used by
subjects of color, “British citizen” summoned up the links between political rights
within colonies and mobility rights abroad. They also asserted the existence of a
single status of full state membership that all British subjects should share but that
those of color did not. This nomenclature, I suggest, helped interwar colonials of
color make analytic and rhetorical use of a resource increasingly available: news
from other corners of empire.
The 1912 debate among the mandarins of empire over a possible “British citizen-
ship” had warned that it was nonwhite subjects’ ability to hear and transfer claims
from one site to the next that made codifying citizenship so risky. “British Indians”
in South Africa and Canada, for instance, had generated a “mass of documents”
relying on “[s]uch phrases as the ‘rights of British citizenship,’ or the ‘rights of
British subjects,’ or the ‘liberties’ of one or other” to protest laws or acts that local
colonial authorities deemed “perfectly legitimate.”73
Two decades later, the growing circulation of local papers within and between colo-
nies meant that news of “colour bars” or declarations of rights spread farther and
faster than ever. T. A. Marryshow, setting out in Grenada in 1915 to channel the
“voice of the people” and turn disempowered Grenadians into “citizens of the
world” by means of the periodical press, had been part of an empire-wide trend.
When colonials of color sought, in Tito Achong’s phrase, to “evaluat[e] their
rights as citizens of the British Empire,” they now had access to a panoramic view
of racist innovations and imperial responses. Those local developments that
“br[ought] home to men that they had no status at all in the British Empire”
now reverberated on an international stage.74
The growth of the independence movement in India made the stakes higher than
ever—as British Caribbeans recognized. Not only did Clennell Wickham write at
length in 1923 of the “social problem of tremendous dimensions” that Great
72 Petition enclosed in letter from Governor, Trinidad, to Ormsby-Gore, 15 May 1937, TNA, CO 318/
425/15.
73 Prefatory note by editors of “United Empire” in British Citizenship, 8.
74 “Trinidad Protests against Venezuela Ban on West Indians,” Daily Gleaner, 14 October 1930, 10.
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Britain faced in Kenya, but he described precisely the long-distance stakes of race-
based disenfranchisement there, noting, “The Indians in India have taken great inter-
est in the matter and regard it as a test case to decide whether or no they really are
partners in the British Empire.”75 Leaders at empire’s center knew to worry. Not
for nothing was Wedgwood Benn, secretary of state for India, appointed to the
1930 Cabinet Committee on East Africa, and not for nothing was he among
those arguing most forcefully that race-blind (in his words) “[e]quality of status
for all British citizens” was “necessary to the solidarity of our Empire.”76 His view
did not prevail. But his argument that imperial stability required full local rights
within an empire-wide status of state-backed belonging marked the irruption into
policy circles of a vernacular theory of imperial citizenship articulated by colonials
from the margins.
The attention of distant audiences might provide new kinds of leverage. When
West Indian students in London protested in 1929 against the spreading “colour
bar” in metropolitan restaurants and hotels, they demanded justice with reference
to “our full rights of British citizenship” and pointedly reminded the secretary of
state that “such acts of discrimination in Great Britain are likely to have far-reaching
repercussive effects in different parts of the Empire.”77 They were not wrong: their
petition was given prominent coverage in the Panama Tribune. The League of
Coloured People, organized by Jamaican physician Harold Moody in London in
1931, likewise framed the fight against discrimination in Britain as part of a
broader struggle. As Moody asked a gathering in 1932, “Why should it be so difficult
for a Coloured British Citizen to earn his living in this country? If the Empire is to be
kept together, this is one of the problems which must be solved.” Moody was, he
declared, “proud of my British citizenship. I am still more proud of my colour. I
do not want to feel that my colour is robbing me of any of the privileges to which
I am entitled as a British citizen.”78 Moody sent the text of his address to
Afro-American leader Dr. Carter Woodson in Washington, DC, for publication
in the Journal of Negro History. But long before it appeared there, it had been
republished in the Panama Tribune by Sidney Young, ever attentive to antiracist
struggles afar.79
Moody was anything but a typical British West Indian abroad. He was a leading
elite within the tiny community of British Caribbeans in the United Kingdom,
itself a small and atypical fraction of the hundreds of thousands of British Caribbeans
“earn[ing] a living” outside the lands of their birth at the moment Moody wrote. But
the ideas about labor, race, rights, and empire that Moody articulated, and his use of
the terms “Coloured British Citizen” and “my British citizenship” to signal the gap
between merited rights and racialized reality, were utterly typical of wider debate.
75 Clennell Wickham, “Here and There,” Barbados Weekly Herald, 1 June 1923, 4.
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Consider the words of one Nathan Jackson, resident of Panama, weighing in on
what patriotism mandated when empire betrayed its own pledges. Labor migration
and print circulation made it possible to evaluate for oneself one’s status in empire, he
explained.
The West Indian if disloyal is becoming so by being driven to it—by force of circum-
stances, by his being more able to make comparisons between certain facts as they
were thirty years ago and as they are now. Yesterday he saw things as they were
pointed out to him; today on account of the fact that he has travelled to various
countries and has read more, he is better able to understand his correct status as a
“Subject” in the Empire.
Unmediated understanding revealed grim trends. Even setting aside the abuses in
immigrant-receiving societies—which loomed large for Jackson, as they did for
many—examples of race-based differentiation abounded.
If we leave out the questions of the wrongs done to and against the West Indians in
foreign countries, you will find that he still has much to resent within the Empire
itself: Such as, The Colour Bar Bill in Africa, Immigration Enactments in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand and the Seamen Restrictions in England. These things
Mr Editor make the British Negro feel that he has not the (De Facto) Status of other
Britishers, which would permit him to come and go as a freeman wherever flies
the Flag. . . . To sum up all, he is not a Citizen of Empire but a subject of the British
people.80
Like Marryshow, like Moody, like Tito Achong, Nathan Jackson summoned up the
status of “Citizen of Empire” precisely to decry its “(De Facto)” betrayal. To be a
loyal subject of the sovereign had long been a respected status in the British Carib-
bean. But to be a subject of the British People was a very different thing. It offered
no scope for locally earned merit; it protected no hallowed liberties or rights. It
defined a political community and declared you subordinate to it.
With the British West Indian not free to “come and go . . . wherever flies the Flag,”
and the “wrongs done . . . in foreign countries” worsening every year, where could
men like Nathan Jackson go? Their home islands had depended for the past three
generations on emigration and remittances to counter the poverty of sugar
regimes. Now the rise of xenophobic populism had closed every former migration
outlet to them: the jobs and benefits of the region’s emergent welfare states were
reserved for citizens alone. As remittances ended and returnees crowded home, the
crisis became acute. “Labour rebellions”—strikes and riots met with deadly force
—shook the region in the late 1930s. Great Britain sent a commission of inquiry
expressly forbidden to consider “constitutional” questions like the electoral franchise
and home rule, and played for time.
Distant war came to the rescue, putting political demands on hold and temporarily
shifting the calculus regarding “alien labor.” US naval base construction in Trinidad
gave employment to thousands, including many from Grenada, Barbados, and other
80 “Correspondence: Loyalty ‘Blinds’ or Spectacles,” Panama American, 21 January 1927, West Indian
page.
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nearby islands.81 A new guestworker program carried over 100,000 temporary
laborers to the wartime United States.82 Some 10,000 more traveled to England
to meet the RAF’s needs.83 Yet with victory over fascism secured, the employment
panorama reverted to its grim prewar norm. The US guestworker program was
rewritten to ensure limited numbers and more limited rights.84 Latin American
republics jealously guarded their borders. Eager to travel and willing to sweat,
where could “Coloured British Citizens” go?
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP IN HOLBORN AND NOTTING HILL
The decades leading up to World War II had found hundreds of thousands of British
West Indians in lands where working-class citizens were increasingly able to turn pol-
itical rights into social entitlements. Nonwhite imperial subjects found themselves
outside the borders, literal and figurative, in an era of expanding rights. The broad
trajectory of expanding entitlements within evolving democracies that confronted
them may sound familiar. This was the history traced by T. H. Marshall in a
lecture at the London School of Economics in 1949 and published the following
year as “Citizenship and Social Class.”85
Certain elements with which Marshall (born 1893) was wrestling had been at the
forefront of discussion among his contemporaries T. A. Marryshow (born 1887),
Clennell Wickham (born 1895), Sidney Young (born 1898), and their fellow
British Caribbean reformers for the previous three decades. Notably absent from
Marshall’s discussion, however, were precisely the two entwined issues that Marry-
show, Wickham, Young, and their peers identified as at the crux of modern British
rights: race and empire. Marshall did not address racial hierarchies of differentiated
political belonging, nor did he mention territorial access, mobility, or right of
abode. In colonial debates over “British citizenship,” as we have seen, such issues
were paramount. Marshall offered a narrower slice of the story.
Marshall argued that the centuries-long expansion of citizenship in Britain had
been driven by demand from below—the demands of new social sectors for inclusion
as full members in the rights-bearing community, and demands that new realms of
human need be incorporated under the umbrella of state obligation, securing first
civil, then political, and finally social rights. The model would have resonated with
Marryshow and Wickham, although in their experience struggles by working-class
Caribbeans for the “privileges of citizenship” and the prerogatives of “true citi-
zens”—political and social rights—had been simultaneous and mutually dependent.
Marshall argued, too, that town-based membership claims had been the building
blocks for making demands of a consolidating national state. This echoed nonwhite
81 Harvey Neptune, Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation (Chapel Hill,
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subjects’ trajectory from claiming merit as “an old respectable citizen” of Port Limon
to claiming voice as “citizens of Port of Spain” to protest marches in pursuit of the
civil, political, and economic rights due “British citizens” across empire and
beyond its borders. Nevertheless, Marshall saw none of this history from the periph-
eries, although it had played out within his lifetime and was culminating in indepen-
dence movements even as he spoke. Much less did he ask how this peripheral
trajectory might have shaped, or might be poised to shape, developments in the
metropole.
Poised it was. On 22 July 1948, Parliament created the formal category of Citizens
of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC), at one stroke giving 800,000,000
British subjects worldwide nominally equal standing and equal rights of entry to
Great Britain. Legislative proponents, scholars report, saw the maintenance of a
shared imperial status as a matter of “mystical” rather than material import: “no
one imagined” that mass migration from the colonies might ensue.86
The notion that colonial citizenship could remain a symbolic promise, or that the
mobility rights reaffirmed by the status did not matter, was starkly myopic. Even as
the Windrush docked at Tilbury, the Jamaican public debated the prospects of the
metropole as a new migrant outlet.87 For the previous four generations, British
West Indian societies had depended, to differing degrees, on emigration and remit-
tances. Within recent memory, restrictionist laws in the republics of the Americas had
barred doors and fractured families across the region, as we have seen spawning
intense debate in the reformist press over exactly what imperial citizenship should
mean. Parliament might have intended CUKC status to confer no new rights, but
there was little chance Grenadians and Barbadians and Jamaicans would let it end
there. They had long experience with the Sisyphean task of turning nominal commit-
ments into substantive rights through active civic engagement; that is, they knew citi-
zenship inside and out.
Like Clennell Wickham, Sidney Young, and T. H. Marshall, Claudia Jones and
Hannah Arendt belonged to the same generation. From distant points of departure,
each found her life marked by the efforts of states to control borders and shape popu-
lations in the 1930s and by the ColdWar of the 1950s. Born in Germany in 1906, the
Jewish Arendt fled the Nazis in the late 1930s and escaped to the United States on an
illegally issued visa in 1941; she became a naturalized citizen in 1950 and began
building a respected career as an anticommunist public intellectual. Claudia Jones
was born in Trinidad in 1915. At the age of nine, she traveled to New York to
rejoin her parents, arriving just four months before the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act
effectively barred further British Caribbean entry to the United States. She joined
the American Communist Party in 1936 and by 1938 had become editor of the
Weekly Review. In the same years in which Arendt found in New York a safe haven,
Jones was harassed there and jailed along with hundreds of other American Commu-
nist Party activists; like many of the foreign-born among them, she was refused
86 Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, quotes 53; see also 17, 35, et passim. See Paul Foot, Immigra-
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naturalization and threatened with deportation. Jones was finally deported in 1955,
and when Trinidad refused her entry, she ended up in London.88
She arrived just as tensions got worse. British West Indians in circum-Caribbean
receiving societies in the 1930s had found elite eugenicists and working-class popu-
lists making common cause against them. Similarly, as new Commonwealth immi-
gration accelerated, elites fretted over the impact on British “stock” of the arrival
of “great quantities of negroes,” while some working-class Britons, competing for
housing and employ, judged the visible newcomers as the cause of their straits.89
In the decade after Claudia Jones’s arrival, working-class white Londoners would
assault British Caribbeans in Notting Hill, picket against immigrants’ access to
employment and housing, and vote into office politicians who promised to shut
the door to further “coloured colonial” immigration.90
While T. H. Marshall’s account of citizenship saw only hard-won achievement
when working-class natives claimed entitlements within states, Hannah Arendt
saw clearly the systematic tension between popular sovereignty and “minorities’”
standing. The emerging nation-state system created vicious, even deadly, shortfalls
of rights. “Passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax receipts,
are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction,” she wrote in 1942.
In the new international order, persons without state membership were rendered
mere “human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention,
are nothing but human beings.”91 They were, as T. A. Marryshow put it a decade
before, “nobody’s child.” Without equating Britain’s empire to Hitler’s Germany,
we can note that Arendt’s experience of rightlessness as a Jew in 1930s Germany
pushed her thinking about states and citizenship along lines parallel to those that
emerged from British West Indian emigrants’ experience of rightlessness in the con-
temporaneous circum-Caribbean.92 As Arendt wrote in a seminal 1951 essay, “The
Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved unenforceable—even in countries
whose constitutions were based upon them—whenever people appeared who were
no longer citizens of any sovereign state.”93
For Arendt, it was the dislocations and racial nationalisms that came with the dis-
mantling of Europe’s multiethnic empires in the wake of World War I that revealed
the fierce cost of statelessness in the modern world. She wrote in 1951 about the
1930s that “[w]e became aware of the existence of a right to have rights . . . only
when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights
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because of the new global political situation.”94 The statement is all too accurate, if by
“we” one means Europeans and North Americans. What she missed was the longer
trajectory through which hundreds of thousands of (non-European) people “became
aware” of the right to have rights and of the price of its absence. They did so not by
expulsion from homelands but by migrating within or beyond empire and discover-
ing that their governing state was not prepared to enforce the rights they had been
promised and that Britain’s white subjects enjoyed.
In broad terms, this is the story of the reaction by the world’s mobile people of
color to the international borders-and-membership regime consolidated in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Viewed globally, the building of those barriers
was of a piece with the history of expanding citizenship for some that Marshall
astutely captured. But this history was entwined with race—with color bars pro-
claimed by democracies and winked at by empire—in ways that escaped Marshall
and Arendt alike.95
We can now analyze more clearly the convergence of events with which this essay
began: Marshall’s 1949 encomium to expansive citizenship; Parliament’s passage of
the race-blind and inclusive 1948 Nationalities Act; and the arrival of the Empire
Windrush. As Marshall heralded, a postwar consensus had emerged that held the
state accountable for much-enhanced social citizenship for all Britons. As public
investment in housing, health, and transportation boomed, Jamaicans, Barbadians,
and other Caribbeans by the thousands found employment as laborers, nurses, and
bus drivers. British West Indian migration to the United Kingdom was thus
driven by consolidation of citizenship in two ways. On the one hand, jobs were
created within the United Kingdom as public expenditure on social services grew;
on the other hand, alternative receiving societies were now closed to British West
Indian entry, precisely because those societies had consolidated their own border
regimes as they built their own welfare states.
The fact that this did not end in a simple tale of labor relocation and political incor-
poration points to the need to understand what Marshall left out and what Arendt
recognized only among white people: the history of citizenship as a state-backed cre-
dential, whose protections could be vitiated by racism and indeed could be taken
away. Self-defined national communities were loath to give newcomers rights, and
sojourners without full state backing were “nothing but human beings.” While the
unitary CUKC status was on paper the epitome of full belonging, Clennell
Wickham (and Tito Achong and Claudia Jones) would have known to expect other-
wise. Imperial subjecthood too had offered nominal uniformity, atop a grievously dif-
ferentiated reality. British Caribbean commentators had lived the reality of second-
94 Ibid., 294.
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class subjecthood and knew the gap between their merit as citizens of empire and
their standing as “subjects of the British people.” This story was an old one.
As colonial immigration and opposition to it swelled in tandem in the late 1950s,
fervent organizing by Claudia Jones and her fellow British West Indian and British
communist activists proved fruitless. Tories wooed working-class votes with warn-
ings that a vote for Labour meant “a nigger for a neighbor.” Labour’s leaders
shifted from conflicted sympathy for immigration restriction to open embrace of
the new nativism.96 Only fourteen years after the 1948 act had created CUKC
status, millions of Commonwealth citizens, British subjects at the moment of their
birth, found the borders of Great Britain barred by the restrictive Commonwealth
Immigration Act of 1962. The nominally race-neutral criteria of “patriality” differ-
entiated between those of European and non-European ancestry quite as effectively
as dictation tests, “continuous passage” requirements, and the Johnson-Reed Act’s
tidy visa allocation had done a generation before.97
Viewed only from the perspective of metropolitan laws, the 1962 act seems a sharp
reversal. But viewed in a longer timeframe on an empire-wide scale, it seems the cul-
mination of a half century’s trends. Those years had seen non-European British sub-
jects unable to claim white Britishers’ rights to mobility across the dominions, had
seen non-European British subjects’ supposedly inviolable right to consular protec-
tion made mockery from Venezuela to Havana, and had seen citizens of Bridgetown
and Port of Spain unable to leverage their local civic participation into a persuasive
brief for enfranchisement within empire.
The 1962 law that turned lifelong subjects into “non-patrials” with no right of
abode and the discriminatory practices that made British residents of color into (in
Claudia Jones’s term) “second class citizens” carried all the more insult because
they coincided with government efforts to join the European Common Market.
As Jones explained, “[T]he doors would close on colored Commonwealth citizens,
while open wide to white European workers.”98 This choice was consistent with a
long history in which, as members of the imperial discussion circle had concluded
in 1912, the diverse local laws and regulations that could be said to comprise imperial
citizenship in toto drew “a much broader distinction between persons of European
and non-European descent than between subject and alien.”99
CONCLUSION
Sonya Rose suggests citizenship is most usefully defined as “a discursive framework
explicating the juridical relationship between people and political community,”
which “provides the basis upon which people can make claims on the political com-
munity concerning juridical rights and duties, political and ethnical practices, and cri-
teria of membership.”100 As legal categories, neither imperial citizenship nor British
96 Jones, “Caribbean Community,” 238; Foot, Immigration and Race.
97 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 181–85; Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, 128–33; Huttenback,
“British Empire”; Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility”; Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global
Colour Line.
98 Jones, “Caribbean Community,” 237.
99 British Citizenship, 44.
100 Rose, Which People’s War, 14–15.
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citizenship existed in the interwar era. As discursive framework, they clearly did,
though just what comprised that framework—which pronouncements, procedures,
disavowals, paeans, and psalms—was neither fixed nor constant. There was a multis-
ited dialogue under way about the boundaries of belonging within empire, and
which authorities counted as authoritative and which traditions as traditional
depended in part on where you stood.
British West Indian subjects summoned up a citizen status they insisted was theirs,
regardless of official intent. They appealed to it with increasing frequency in the inter-
war years, as international developments made claims in the name of citizenship
more weighty (the “discursive framework” did not stop at empire’s borders). Threa-
tened emigrés in Costa Rica and Panama, and frustrated reformers in Barbados,
Grenada, and Trinidad spoke of imperial citizenship as a promise perpetually unful-
filled. Harold Moody, declaring himself a proud British citizen also proud of his
color, echoed a broader pattern of colonial insistence that citizenship be race blind
but racism aware. The Limón Searchlight editors, asking “what is the attitude of
the British government toward her Negro Citizens?” did likewise. These were
bitter years. But disappointment could drive crucial and creative shifts, a potential
Sidney Young signaled as he quoted Patrick Henry: “If this be treason, make the
most of it.”
T. H. Marshall and Hannah Arendt, writing in the immediate postwar era, stressed
the fundamental political shifts of the preceding generation. This essay has traced the
usage of the term “citizen” across that same era in one subsystem of the colonized
world. Those who found themselves systematically excluded by the emerging inter-
national regime nevertheless insisted on seeing themselves as full members of the
modern world. They never doubted their own right to have rights. They sought to
turn local civic participation into portable state-backed rights through multiple
routes: newspapers and new parties, petitions and protests. These processes,
enacted at the margins of empire in the interwar era, would in the postwar era
shift their stage to the metropolitan core, on the one hand, and postcolonial island
nations, on the other, and for clear historical reasons: in the emergent international
system, it was only in their “own” state that workers could stake a claim, or
claim a stake.
Legal theorist Linda Bosniak has called on scholars to bring into dialogue the lit-
eratures on the “hard” external shell of citizenship—studies that tend to emphasize
the prevalence and human price of exclusion—and its “soft” internal content—
studies that often foreground the benefits of participatory inclusion.101 Arendt,
describing the loss of the right to have rights by refugees and displaced persons,
was writing about the former; Marshall was writing about the latter. But the Carib-
bean sojourners discussed above knew the soft and the hard; the domestic and the
international; the civic, the electoral, and the protective credential to be connected.
Scholars from Marshall to Rose and beyond have analyzed the making of citizen-
ship as a participatory, sometimes conflictive, process. Is citizenship as external shell
also the result of negotiation between people and state? No and yes, I suggest. Citi-
zenship as a state-backed credential controlling access to territory and work hit
101 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, 2008),
1–16.
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British West Indians like a slow-moving train wreck. There was no space for nego-
tiation, unless we stretch the concept to include the “weapons of the weak”: lying
to consuls, faking birth certificates, and stowing away.
Yet this experience of state power did shift the terms of debate over political
belonging. Seeing this requires widening our understanding of the geographic
frame within which sociocultural processes reverberate. Looking at a New World
and sometimes extra-imperial stage to track claims about British citizenship, we
found that state building and restrictionism in the Americas shaped colonial subjects’
demands vis-à-vis colonial governments back home (in terms of political rights) and
the imperial state in London (in terms of mobility rights). By the 1930s, the ques-
tions of state support for those who wished to cross borders, and of the degree to
which race negated such support, were central to British Caribbean debates over citi-
zenship within empire. Postwar migration to Britain was both the outcome of those
dynamics and the start of a new stage, in which they would be sorted out, not at the
margins of empire, but at its very core.
The present article has attempted to recognize as part of a single historical moment
individuals whose ideas about moral progress and political belonging are rarely
treated in tandem: metropolitan political philosophers, crusading Afro-Caribbean
editors, and West Indians seeking work. Much recent scholarship on “citizenship
from the bottom up” comes down to a simple suggestion. Ordinary people have
experiences of states and ideas about rights, and these experiences and ideas matter
to the conflictive processes through which states and rights evolve. If we broaden
our understanding of twentieth-century political theory to include the insights that
all of these thinkers have to offer, we will be better prepared to tackle the dilemmas
of mobility, belonging, and rights that confront us with urgency a half century later.
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